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A Different Model for the Right to Privacy:
The Political Question Doctrine as a Substitute
for Substantive Due Process
PATRICK M. GARRY
INTRODUCTION
The constitutional right to privacy first articulated by the Supreme
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,' and later used to fashion abortion
rights in Roe v. Wade,2 has been the subject of intense criticism over the
past four decades. This criticism focuses on the substantive due process
approach employed by the Court in its privacy decisions. Under such an
approach, the Court surveys the ambiguous terrain of American history
and tradition to find that a certain right, such as privacy, is to be pro-
tected on the same level as those rights and liberties specifically enumer-
ated in the Bill of Rights. Critics of this approach argue that the Court
has no business protecting rights not enumerated in the Constitution, and
that a right of privacy should not be based on judicial determinations of
what specific activities define the meaning and destiny of human life.
Aside from criticisms of substantive due process, the constitutional
shakiness of the right of privacy can also be seen through the lens of the
political question doctrine. As first announced by Chief Justice Mar-
shall in Marbury v. Madison,3 the political question doctrine directs the
judiciary to abstain from deciding certain political questions that are bet-
ter suited for the legislative or executive branches. Even though this
doctrine has generally not been applied to individual rights, and even
though it has never been specifically applied to a right of privacy, it
nonetheless provides a useful measuring stick for gauging whether pri-
vacy is a matter on which the judicial branch should defer to the legisla-
tive branch. Thus, the political question doctrine provides a second
frame of reference, apart from the substantive due process approach, for
criticizing the Court's privacy decisions.
This Article uses the political question doctrine to show that pri-
vacy is the type of right or interest that would be better protected by the
political branches than by the courts. Even though the doctrine does not
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a right of privacy exists).
2. 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (including a woman's right to have an abortion within the zone
of privacy created in Griswold by ruling that an unborn fetus was not a "person" under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
3. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
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normally apply to individual rights, privacy is not the kind of individual
right that most other constitutionally protected liberties are. For
instance, unlike the equal protection rights of racial minorities, privacy
is not a right or interest possessed only by an insular minority group in
society. Instead, privacy is an interest shared by all members of society,
regardless of ethnic, gender, or racial identity. For this reason, privacy
fits the criteria of the political question doctrine better than any other
constitutionally recognized individual right.
The political question doctrine strives to protect the judiciary from
becoming involved in issues in which it is not competent to act. The
doctrine also strives to uphold the legitimacy of judicial authority by
preventing the courts from being exposed to criticism and ridicule
prompted by decisions that appear subjective and unprincipled and that
stray from the constitutional text. Indeed, as the past four decades have
revealed, the Court's privacy decisions have been just the kind of deci-
sions the political question doctrine aims to prevent the judiciary from
making. The Court has never been able to articulate a clear, principled
privacy right that is immune from widespread criticism. As the events
of the past four decades have suggested, the legislative branch would be
a far more effective arbiter of the privacy right.
Part I of this Article examines the political question doctrine as it
has evolved from its initial articulation by the Marshall Court. Part II of
this Article analyzes recent scholarship and interpretations of the politi-
cal question doctrine and examines these interpretations in terms of
whether the doctrine could be applied to individual rights, specifically
the right of privacy. Finally, Part III of this Article examines the right of
privacy and its history in the Supreme Court. This analysis of the con-
stitutional right of privacy shows that, under both the purpose and intent
of the political question doctrine, privacy is a matter on which the courts
have no constitutionally-principled basis for assuming exclusive juris-
diction. As indicated by the political question doctrine, the American
constitutional scheme suggests that, with regard to privacy issues, the
courts should defer to the political branches.
I. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
A. History and Purpose
The political question doctrine limits the judiciary's jurisdiction by
defining those constitutional questions that fall outside the proper scope
of judicial decision-making.4 It removes from the courts' domain cer-
4. U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 458 (1992) (stating that the political
question doctrine recognizes "that a constitutional provision may not be judicially enforceable").
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tain subjects that do not lend themselves to judicial resolution.' As
Professors Ferejohn and Kramer have described the political question
doctrine:
What matters (and is expected) is that, over time, the Supreme Court
has declared that federal courts could not, and so should not, deal
with certain questions because they are too political. These are not
necessarily the most controversial questions, though they are plenty
controversial (or would be if the Court tried to resolve them). They
are, rather, potentially controversial, questions in areas where courts
are more at sea than usual, more lacking in the sort of legal resources
that enable them to insulate their decisions from easy political coun-
terattack. Sometimes this is because the constitutional text and his-
tory leave the Court more adrift than usual; other times it turns on the
inherent nature of the issue itself.6
The roots of the doctrine reach back to Marbury v. Madison, where
Chief Justice John Marshall recognized the existence of political ques-
tions that by their nature can never be resolved by the courts.7 In Mar-
bury, Marshall argued that the Court's judicial power did not extend to
matters falling under the political question doctrine.8 He also provided
several guideposts for determining when to invoke the doctrine: Will the
factfinding required to resolve the issue be of the type normally suited to
the expertise of the political branches? Are there established legal stan-
dards that can be used to decide the issue? Does the issue involve a more
general question of political judgment and discretion?9
5. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217-18 (1962) (stating that particular issues are
nonjusticiable because they fall outside of the courts' domain).
6. John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1013-14 (2002).
7. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170.
8. Id. Although the determination of when a particular issue constituted a political question
would always depend on the unique nature of the issue, Chief Justice Marshall did indicate that
issues of foreign policy and the presidential power of appointments would usually constitute a
political question. Id. at 166-67. See also Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, Marshall's
Questions, 2 GREEN BAc 2 D 367, 372-74 (1999) (stating that Marshall saw political questions as
those including "a judgment about where the nation's interests lay, including its interests in justice
to itself and others and in the preservation of national security," as opposed to issues of individual
rights). In the field of national security, for instance, the courts' lack of expertise and information,
as well as their lack of political accountability, inhibited their ability to make good judgments. Id.
at 372. Under the political question doctrine, the Court has stayed away from issues generally
involving foreign policy, treaties with foreign government, presidential use of war powers,
challenges to the impeachment process, and questions pertaining to the structure of politics,
including various aspects of political parties. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238
(1993); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4 (1972); Commercial Trust Co. of N.J. v. Miller, 262 U.S.
51, 57 (1923); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 157-58 (3d ed. 1999) (examining judicial refusals to hear challenges to U.S. foreign
policy in Vietnam, El Salvador, and Persian Gulf).
9. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 166; see also Oliver P. Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions
in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REV. 485, 512 (1924) (arguing that an important consideration
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This view of the political question 'doctrine existed alongside the
limited notion of judicial review incorporated into the Constitution.' 0
Alexander Hamilton, for instance, believed that the judiciary could nul-
lify legislative acts only when an "irreconcilable variance" existed
between the Constitution and the statute." Justice Chase argued that the
Court could declare a law unconstitutional only "in a very clear case.""2
Likewise, Justice Paterson argued that courts could strike down only
those laws that presented "a clear and unequivocal breach of the consti-
tution, not a doubtful and argumentative application."13
In the early national period, it was "anticipated and clearly fore-
seen" that many constitutional issues would never be decided by the
judiciary. 4 According to Lawrence Sager, the structure of the Constitu-
tion envisioned that some issues would never reach the courts.' 5 This
structure created "a spectrum of deference that recognized that the Con-
stitution delegates authority to the political branches to different degrees,
and that some of those delegations permit the political branches to give
substantive meaning to the constitutional provisions in the exercise of
their discretion."' 6 Thus, political questions were among those ques-
tions or issues that were both outside judicial review and within the
exclusive authority of the political branches.
In applying the political question doctrine, courts must first deter-
mine whether the Constitution "gives some interpretive authority to the
political branches on the question being raised and to 'specify the
boundaries of what has been allocated elsewhere.' '"17 The doctrine
in applying the political question doctrine is whether there is "a lack of legal principles to apply to
the questions presented").
10. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 238-40 (2000) (stating that "even a limited power of
judicial review remained controversial in the 1780s").
11. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
12. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 171, 175 (1796).
13. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 14, 19 (1800).
14. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 135-36 (1893).
15. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1263-64 (1978).
16. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 322 (2002). Thus, the
threshold inquiry in constitutional cases is "to determine how much interpretive deference should
be accorded the political branches based on the language and structure of the Constitution." Id. at
323. It makes sense for the Constitution to delegate interpretive authority to the political branches
in certain cases because of the factfinding ability of those branches and because of their political
accountability. Id. at 324.
17. Id. at 239 (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1983) (stating that the Constitution recognizes "that some questions rest
within the absolute discretion of the political branches")).
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reflects the realization that the legislative or executive branches may be
better able to address certain issues - issues on which courts can be both
poor factfinders and policymakers. To the degree that a constitutional
issue "raises questions of policy or rests on factual findings, there may
be sound reasons to defer to the judgment of Congress and the
Executive."18
The Framers' views that political questions were outside the scope
of judicial review prevailed well into the nineteenth century. As Mark
Graber notes in his study of judicial review in Jacksonian America,
political questions were rarely translated into judicial questions.' 9
Indeed, there were many constitutional debates or issues that were never
transferred to the judicial docket. For instance, the Court did not decide
any of the ethno-cultural controversies that arose during the pre-Civil
War period, even when those controversies involved individual liberty.
The federal courts never decided a case involving the rights of Masons;
the courts never addressed the freedom of Mormons settling in Utah to
adopt laws that conflicted with federal law; the judiciary never got
involved in the call for a "united front" against Catholic schools and
Catholic officeholders; nor did it address the nascent women's move-
ment.20 According to Professor Graber, the "most significant differ-
ences between judicial agendas in 1835 and in 2004 reflect differences
in the extent to which constitutional questions are resolved into judicial
questions."2"
In addition to the classical version of the political question doctrine,
based on the text and structure of the Constitution, a prudential version
of the doctrine has evolved. 22 Unlike the classical version of the politi-
cal question doctrine, the prudential version is not rooted in the Consti-
tution itself, but is a judicially created doctrine used to avoid conflict
with the other branches of government. 23 This prudential version of the
political question doctrine has been used "to delegate judicial authority
to political actors (even when the Constitution does not contemplate
18. Id. at 240. Some commentators have described the political question doctrine not as a
matter of justiciability, but as one of giving appropriate deference to the judgments of other
branches of government. See, e.g., HERBERT WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 11-14 (1961); Louis
Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 622-23 (1976).
19. Mark A.Graber, Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions: Tocqueville's
Thesis Revisited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 485, 529 (2004).
20. Id. at 515-16.
21. Id. at 534 (noting that at present, "virtually all political questions that are resolved into
constitutional questions are further resolved into judicial questions").
22. See Barkow, supra note 16, at 253.
23. Id.
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such a delegation) and to avoid deciding controversial cases."24 The
prudential version of the political question doctrine can perhaps best be
seen through the writings of Alexander Bickel. Concerned about the
judicial activism of the Warren era and its threat to the Court's legiti-
macy, Bickel argued that the Court should be reluctant to decide certain
controversial cases on the merits.25 As an example of such restraint,
Bickel cited Naim v. Naim, a case in which the Court avoided deciding
on the merits an attempt to nullify a marriage that allegedly violated a
state miscegenation statute.2 6 According to Bickel, the prudential ver-
sion of the political question doctrine provides a means by which the
Court can avoid difficult matters that might threaten its legitimacy and
authority.27
Professor Barkow describes the political question doctrine in terms
of judicial deference to the political branches' ability to interpret the
Constitution.28 Because of the judiciary's limited powers under the
structure of the Constitution, the political branches in various circum-
stances - e.g., political questions - possess equal authority to decide
constitutional issues.29 This ability of the political branches to resolve
certain constitutional questions arises from their accountability to the
public. As John Hancock argued, the ability to vote a member of Con-
gress out of office "will prove a security to [the people's] liberties, and a
most important check to the power of the general government."30 Thus,
as Professor Barkow notes:
[T]he theory of deference to the political branches that has been with
us throughout our nation's history - a theory that, at its extreme,
includes the political question doctrine - reflects not only the struc-
24. Id.
25. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 69, 168-70, 251-54 (2d ed. Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962). The political
question doctrine provides a tool with which the Court can refrain from deciding cases on the
merits, when doing so would be imprudent. See Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the
Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
26. 350 U.S. 891 (1955); Bickel, supra note 25, at 174 (arguing that to uphold the statute
"would have been unthinkable" in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education, but that it would
have been dangerous to strike down the law when the integration principles of Brown were still so
vulnerable to attack).
27. See Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term - Foreword: The Passive Virtues,
75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 43-51, 74-79 (1961) (arguing that the political question doctrine enables
courts to avoid judicial activism by avoiding certain controversial and unprecedented matters).
28. Barkow, supra note 16, at 319.
29. See Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (May 6, 1821), in 9 WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 55, 59 (Gaillard Hunt, ed., 1910) (criticizing the Court's interpretation of the
Framers' views on nationalization and arguing that Congress should adopt its own interpretation).
30. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, 1787, at 168
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. J.B. Lippincott Co. 1881) (1836).
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ture and text of the Constitution, but a very pragmatic determination
that some questions should be decided by the political branches
because of their accountability and institutional competence.31
B. The Baker v. Carr Legacy
The political question doctrine was most significantly defined and
altered in Baker v. Carr, where the Court articulated a test for defining a
political question from which the courts should abstain.32 According to
this test, the political question doctrine applied to cases involving one or
more of the following six criteria:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discov-
erable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossi-
bility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question.33
In a later case, the Supreme Court tried to simplify the subject by indi-
cating that the political question doctrine encompasses three inquiries:
"(i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text
of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of government? (ii) Would
resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of
judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations counsel against
judicial intervention?"
34
The detailed set of criteria laid out in Baker, however, has not
appeared to give much life or vitality to the doctrine. Since Baker, the
Court has steered "an erratic and inconsistent course in how it has used
and explained the political question doctrine over time."'3 5 As one com-
mentator has noted, despite the carefully developed criteria, "the doc-
trine has rarely served as a meaningful restraint on the Supreme Court's
31. Barkow, supra note 16, at 329-30.
32. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In Baker, the Court was presented with the issue of whether
Tennessee's apportionment statute, which had not been amended in sixty years to account for a
significant shift of population from rural to urban areas, violated the Equal Protection Clause by
diluting the urban vote and disproportionately emphasizing the rural vote. Id. at 187-95.
Opponents to this challenge argued that the Tennessee law, a state law governing the electoral
process, raised a nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 266-70, 289-302 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
33. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
34. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979).
35. Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 6, at 1013.
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authority. '3 6 One reason given for the decline of the political question
doctrine is that Justice Brennan's decision in Baker, transforming the
doctrine into a discretionary, case-by-case, six-factor test, focused exclu-
sively on separation of powers concerns and abandoned the emphasis on
federalism that had traditionally been a part of the doctrine.37 As Profes-
sor Pushaw notes:
[T]he Court in the twentieth century gradually lost sight of the Feder-
alist model of judicial review and political questions. Indeed, the
doctrine was in such intellectual disarray by 1962 that it was fairly
easy for the Warren Court to cherry-pick material in various cases to
support its result. As we have seen, however, the Baker analysis
depends almost entirely on the discretion of the majority of the Jus-
tices, untethered to any legal principles rooted in the Constitution's
structure, theory, history, or early precedent.
38
Subsequent to Baker, the Supreme Court has only invoked the
political question doctrine to refrain from deciding a case on two occa-
sions. In Gilligan v. Morgan, the Court ruled that the issue of whether
the elected branches had been negligent in military training and proce-
dures was a political question outside the Court's scope of review.39
Then, in Nixon v. United States, the Court held that the impeachment of
a federal judge presented a nonjusticiable political question.40
Some commentators have theorized that the decline of the political
question doctrine results from the rise of judicial supremacy. 4' Profes-
sor Tushnet argues that the political question doctrine can hardly survive
"in a world where the Court is comfortable with interpreting the Consti-
36. Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DuKE L.J.
1457, 1459 (2005) ("scholars have concluded that political questions are in serious decline, if not
fully expired, because they are clearly at odds with the notion of judicial supremacy adopted by
the Court in recent years"); see also Barkow, supra note 16, at 240 (arguing that the "demise of
the political question doctrine is of recent vintage, and it correlates with the ascendancy of a novel
theory of judicial supremacy").
37. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving
the Federalist "Rebuttable Presumption" Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1166, 1177 (2002)
(stating that "the Baker Court simply cast aside a core structural and theoretical principle -
federalism" and recognizing that "contrary to the majority's assertions, many of the Court's
political question opinions had expressed concerns for preserving federalism").
38. Id. at 1195-96. The Court in Baker v. Carr ruled that the political question doctrine did
not apply to cases involving the federal judiciary's relationship with the states. Baker, 369 U.S. at
210 (stating that the political question doctrine is "primarily a function of the separation of
powers" between the three branches of the federal government).
39. 413 U.S. 1, 5-12 (1973).
40. 506 U.S. 224, 226-38 (1993).
41. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The
Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203,
1208 (2002) (arguing that "notions of judicial supremacy" along with "skepticism about the ability
of the political branches to behave in a constitutionally responsible manner undermines" the
enforcement of the political question doctrine).
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tution and uncomfortable with allowing anyone else to do so."'4 2 Profes-
sor Barkow similarly argues that the erosion of the political question
doctrine coincided with the Court's assertion of judicial supremacy that
began during the Warren era. 3 Barkow notes that "the demise of the
political question doctrine is part and parcel of this larger trend of refus-
ing to accord interpretive deference to the political branches. ' ' "4 Indeed,
since the founding period, it was thought "that some constitutional ques-
tions ultimately must be decided by the political branches and not
through judicial review."45 However, because the political question doc-
trine conflicts with the notion of judicial supremacy over all constitu-
tional questions, the modem Court has eliminated that tension by
essentially abandoning the former.
4 6
Whereas the political question doctrine went hand in hand with the
judicial restraint of the New Deal Court, it contrasted sharply with the
judicial activism of the Warren Court, which in turn cut back the doc-
trine in Baker v. Carr.47 In recent decades, according to Professor Bar-
kow, the Court "has become increasingly blind to its [policymaking]
limitations as an institution - and, concomitantly, to the strengths of the
political branches."48 Under the influence of judicial supremacy, the
"unmistakable trend is toward a view that all constitutional questions are
matters for independent judicial interpretation and that Congress has no
42. Id. at 1211 (noting that case law has shown "how difficult it is for the Justices to assert
unqualifiedly that a particular constitutional provision really has no meaning the Court can
identify").
43. See Barkow, supra note 16, at 237 ("the fall of the political question doctrine is part of a
larger trend in which the Supreme Court has embraced the view that it alone among the three
branches of government has the power and competency to provide the full substantive meaning of
all constitutional provisions").
44. See id. at 317 (arguing that a strong view of judicial supremacy "demands the demise of
the political question doctrine").
45. See id. at 240 (theorizing that the "ascendancy of a novel theory of judicial supremacy" is
responsible for the Court's disregard of the political branches' ability to decide constitutional
questions).
46. See id. at 242, 244 (arguing that "the political question doctrine would still spark a heated
response from defenders of a supreme judiciary because it stands in tension with the notion of
judicial review; it represents the idea that some constitutional questions fall outside the purview of
the judiciary").
47. See id. at 263. As Professor Barkow notes, this curtailment of the political question
doctrine reflects the Court's inflated and overestimated powers vis-A-vis the political branches. Id.
at 300 (arguing that the "political question doctrine itself cannot coexist with the current Court's
views of how interpretive power is allocated under the Constitution"). Thus, the Court's view of
judicial supremacy, "regardless of the constitutional provision at issue or the policy judgments"
needed to resolve the issue, has eroded the deference due to legislative decisions under the
political question doctrine, and "has allowed the Court to bypass the threshold determination of
how much interpretive power a provision of the Constitution gives political actors." Id. at 319.
48. See id. at 301. This blindness is in stark contrast to the early Court, which stated that
Congress's constitutional judgments should be struck down only if plainly erroneous. Id.
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special institutional advantage in answering aspects of particular
questions."'4 9
II. APPLYING THE DOCTRINE TO INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
In addition to the Court's restatement of the political question doc-
trine in Baker v. Carr, a number of other versions have been proposed
by scholars.50 Most recently, Jesse Choper offered a new definition of
the doctrine. Under Professor Choper's definition, the classification of
an issue as a nonjusticiable political question depends on four different
factors: (1) whether there is a textual commitment in the Constitution to
have the issue decided by a particular branch; (2) whether the issue at
hand is a structural issue like separation of powers, or whether it is one
of individual rights; (3) whether there are judicially manageable stan-
dards to resolve the issue; and (4) whether the issue presents a unique
and individualized controversy, or whether it reflects a more generalized
grievance.51 Professor Choper more fully describes these factors as
follows:
I believe that the Court should consider four criteria in determining
whether to relegate questions of constitutional interpretation to the
political branches. First, the Court should refrain from deciding
questions where there is a textual commitment to a coordinate politi-
cal department - that is, when the Constitution itself is interpreted as
clearly referring the resolution of a question to an elected branch.
Second, pursuant to a functional rather than a textual approach, when
49. See id. at 302. On the other hand, Justice Scalia has used the political question doctrine to
bolster his argument that other branches of government also have the authority to interpret the
Constitution. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 612-13 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the political question doctrine reflects that not all constitutional violations must be resolved in
the courts).
50. One of the first to do so was Alexander Bickel, whose criteria for invoking the doctrine
depended on: (a) the strangeness of the issue and its intractability to principled resolution; (b) the
sheer momentousness of it, which tends to unbalance judicial judgment; (c) the anxiety that the
judicial judgment should be ignored, but will not be; (d) (in a mature democracy) the inner
vulnerability, the self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no earth to
draw strength from. Bickel, supra note 25, at 184. Bickel's articulation of the political question
doctrine reflects his belief that the Court should act with prudence and hence refrain from deciding
certain cases on the merits. See id. at 247-54. According to Bickel, the political question doctrine
provided a way of avoiding particularly controversial issues that could weaken the Court's public
image and legitimacy. See id. at 125-26, 183-84. Cass Sunstein similarly advocates a cautious,
restraining attitude on certain novel types of issues, on which she believes that the courts should
act in a "minimalist way." CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON
THE SUPREME COURT 5, 9-14 (1999).
51. Choper, supra note 36, at 1457. The textual commitment factor resembles the first factor
listed in Baker v. Carr; the second factor envisions areas in which the political process has a
comparative advantage over the courts; the third recognizes that there may be constitutional
provisions for which the Court lacks the capacity to develop clear principles; and the fourth relates
to whether an issue is sufficiently tailored for judicial resolution. Id.
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judicial review is thought to be unnecessary for the effective preser-
vation of our constitutional scheme, the Court should decline to exer-
cise its interpretive authority. Third, the Court should not decide
issues for which it cannot formulate principled, coherent tests as a
result of a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards.
Finally, I would tentatively suggest that constitutional injuries that
are general and widely shared are also candidates for being treated as
political questions.5"
Professor Choper recognizes that in some cases involving individual
rights, an area traditionally reserved to the judiciary, a conveyance of
authority to the legislative branch "may result in greater protection for
personal liberties than would the Court's deciding the merits."53
Other commentators have portrayed the political question doctrine
as a matter not of jurisdiction but of deference. For instance, certain
constitutional provisions, such as those involving electoral matters, even
though justiciable, "should be interpreted with extraordinary deference
to the elected branches."54 Using this deferential approach, the Court
should review particular issues under standards that "resolve every
doubt in favor of the validity of the government's action."55 Thus, even
though the Court can assert jurisdiction, it should defer to the judgment
of political officials, "absent a plain violation of an existing constitu-
tional right."56
The political question doctrine has never been applied to individual
rights issues, other than those that might arise in the context of foreign
or military policy. In fact, most judges and commentators seem to pre-
sumptively disqualify individual rights from the reach of the political
question doctrine. This Article argues, however, that the constitutional
right of privacy first recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut is a unique
individual right that could be treated similar to a political question.5
This uniqueness, as further described in Part III below, stems from the
fact that privacy is not a minority right in danger of oppression by the
majority. As a way of introducing this thesis, the right of privacy will be
briefly analyzed here under the four factors proposed by Professor
Choper.
The first factor, textual commitment, ends up being a wash.
52. Id. at 1462-63.
53. Id. at 1464.
54. Pushaw, supra note 37, at 1199.
55. Id. (arguing that "the Court should not upset federal or state electoral determinations
unless they violate established constitutional rights").
56. Id. (arguing that the Supreme Court, before taking action in Bush v. Gore, should have
waited for Congress and Florida's legislature to fulfill their constitutional obligations).
57. For a discussion of the constitutional right of privacy, see infra notes 87-89 and
accompanying text.
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Although the Constitution does not assign to any branch other than the
judiciary the duty to be the final arbiter of the right of privacy, the Con-
stitution, in fact, does not even mention this right. Therefore, since the
Framers intended the legislative branch to be the primary governor of
society, it can be assumed that they intended any privacy interests to be
determined and defined in that branch.58
Choper's second factor relates to the distinction between structural
issues and substantive issues involving individual rights. At first glance,
this factor seems to work against treating privacy as a political question.
According to Professor Choper, however, the basic rationale for this fac-
tor rests on notions of institutional competence. 59 Matters of govern-
ment structure and operation are well-suited to the political branches,
while matters of minority rights are traditionally the specialty of the
courts. However, as will be demonstrated in Part III, with respect to the
right of privacy, the political branches can be trusted to produce sound
constitutional decisions - perhaps even more sound than the judiciary
can produce. Consequently, by refraining to intervene "when the politi-
cal branches may be trusted to produce a sound constitutional decision,
the Justices reduce the discord between judicial review and majoritarian
democracy and enhance their ability to render enforceable decisions
when their participation is vitally needed."60 This observation has been
substantiated by the abortion decisions, in which the Court's privacy
jurisprudence has never been able to "reduce the discord between judi-
cial review and majoritarian democracy."'"
As Professor Choper states, the distinction between individual
rights and structural issues exists because "where personal rights of
underrepresented interests are at stake, it cannot often be assumed that
the majoritarian political process can produce a trustworthy result."
62
But unlike, for instance, the equal protection rights of political minori-
ties, privacy does not involve an underrepresented interest - it involves
an interest that every human being possesses and must balance with his
or her need to participate in a strong, self-sustaining society. Indeed,
even Professor Choper recognizes that situations might exist where the
political question doctrine applies to individual rights issues.
63
58. See United States v. Williams, 691 F. Supp. 36, 43-44, 52-53 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (stating
that the Framers expected Congress "to assume primary responsibility for the formulation of
policy [and that this] is true particularly in areas that impinge on personal liberties").
59. See Choper, supra note 36, at 1466.
60. See id.
61. See Id.
62. See id. at 1469.
63. See id. (arguing that "there may be controversies implicating personal liberties that the
Court concludes are governed by the political question doctrine").
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Professor Choper's third factor urges judicial restraint on issues
lacking "judicially discoverable and manageable standards. 64 Such
restraint is necessary when the Court is asked to deal with issues on
which it "lacks the capacity to develop clear and coherent principles to
govern litigants' conduct."65 As will be further analyzed in Part III, this
factor is especially applicable to the argument for treating privacy as a
political question, particularly since the Court's definition of the right of
privacy has been anything but clear and coherent. Furthermore, the
Court's privacy jurisprudence has enabled both litigants and judges to
inject their own ideological beliefs into the formation and application of
constitutional doctrine.
The fourth factor - generalized grievance - addresses cases that do
not involve unique and individualized injuries, but rather those that are
shared by a wide group of people in a similar way. As Choper explains:
Generalized grievance cases may encompass individual constitutional
rights insofar as all (or almost all) persons may truly be said to have
suffered comparable injury in respect to their personal liberties. This
may fairly lead to the conclusion that a decision by a government
body that is accountable to an electoral majority trustworthily repre-
sents all affected.
6 6
The first case in which the Court recognized a constitutional right to
privacy - Griswold v. Connecticut7 - involved state regulation of the
sale and distribution of contraceptives. This regulatory scheme did not
impinge on an insular minority; it affected the vast majority of adults,
regardless of ethnic, racial or gender identity. As such, any harm it
caused qualified as a generalized grievance. With generalized griev-
ances, "there is little reason to believe that the ordinary political process
is not a fair and trustworthy method for resolving its concerns.
68
What distinguishes a generalized grievance from a fundamental
individual right, exempt from the political question doctrine, is that the
latter serves to protect "an identifiable racial, religious, or political
minority that might be subject to majoritarian abuse."' 69 However, this is
64. See id. at 1469-70. This factor, taken from Baker v. Carr, addresses issues involving both
divisions of governmental powers and individual rights, and envisions that with some issues the
Court may have to exercise a "decidedly practical restraint on justiciability." Id. at 1470.
65. See id. at 1469-70 (arguing that the real question is not just whether a particular standard
is constitutionally warranted, but whether it can be "sufficiently principled to guide the lower
courts and constrain all jurists from inserting their own ideological beliefs in ad hoc, unreasoned
ways").
66. See id. at 1472.
67. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
68. Choper, supra note 36, at 1473.
69. Id. (arguing that the personal liberty established by the Statement and Account Clause is
not a liberty that falls within this class of "fundamental" rights).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
not the case with privacy, which is the kind of "right that belongs to the
majority (rather than an endangered, constitutionally guarded minor-
ity)."7 Therefore, the political process can be trusted to protect the right
of privacy, since any law that unduly infringes on it can be repealed
whenever democratic society desires a heightened protection of privacy
interests. This dynamic was demonstrated in the debate over the Patriot
Act.7" Indeed, the brief history of the Patriot Act shows how society
should reconcile privacy rights with other social interests. After the Act
was passed, there were allegations of privacy invasions. This led to a
highly charged debate in Congress, two temporary extensions, and a
presidential election that focused in part on this Act.72 Yet despite all
this, the Patriot Act was renewed in the Senate by a landslide vote of 89-
10.
7 3
As revealed in the legislative resolution of privacy concerns with
the Patriot Act, the balance between national security and privacy rights
is not a balance the courts should reach. According to Professor Lerner,
the resolution of conflicts between the executive's duty to uncover infor-
mation regarding threats to national security and the consequent com-
promises to privacy rights is a political question." Privacy is not an
individual right subject to majority infringement in the same way that
religious exercise by minority religions or equal protection of racial
minorities are. With privacy, as with term limits, "there is no structural
barrier to the electorate's repealing previously enacted [laws] if they no
longer command the majority's support."'75 Thus, the ordinary political
process can provide a sufficient protection of the right to privacy.
In Vieth v. Jubelirer, a plurality of the Court supported a ruling that
all political gerrymandering issues constituted political questions and
hence were nonjusticiable. 76 The plurality relied on the argument that a
judicial drawing of electoral districts would be unmanageable and
70. Id. (arguing that the Statement and Account Clause is a majority fight which a future
majority, if it so wishes, may reclaim through the political process).
71. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
72. Extension of Sunset of Certain Provisions of the USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. No. 109-
160, 119 Stat. 2957 (2005) (extending provisions from December 31, 2005 to February 3, 2006);
Extension of Sunset of Certain Provisions of the USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. No. 109-170, 120
Stat. 3 (2006) (extended provisions to March 10, 2006).
73. 152 CONG. Roc. S1598, S1631-32 (2006).
74. Craig S. Lemer, The USA Patriot Act: Promoting the Cooperation of Foreign Intelligence
Gathering and Law Enforcement, 11 GEO. MASON L. REv. 493, 511 (2003).
75. Choper, supra note 36, at 1475-76 (arguing that term limit laws do not threaten to subject
any identifiable racial, religious, or political minority to the abuse of the majority).
76. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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unprincipled.77 As Professor Choper has observed about issues of politi-
cal gerrymandering:
Ultimately, this may be one of those contexts in which the judicial
branch cannot develop effective safeguards for individual rights, but
where the political process may afford some meaningful protection,
however flawed. A political party in power, for example, may
restrain itself from the worst excesses of gerrymandering because it
fears either future retaliation within its own jurisdiction should the
electorate reverse its advantage, or the possibility that its avarice will
be presently emulated in other states where its opponents are in
control.78
But this same argument can be made about the right of privacy, which
requires the Court to make unprincipled and unfounded decisions about
what areas of life a diverse and democratic people believe to be crucial
to their individual sense of human dignity and autonomy.
In a way, privacy rights are like education rights. They are rights -
or more accurately, interests - that each member of society shares;
neither privacy nor education is a right or interest confined to any dis-
creet social minority. Every person wants privacy, as he does an educa-
tion, but these privacy and education interests must also be balanced
against other social interests - e.g., the cost of education, and how this
cost will be paid. The question of privacy is a question of how society is
going to balance social values with individual ones, just as the question
of how society funds education is one involving the basic vision of a
society, as well as a balancing of the interests of individual opportunity
and social progress.79
In litigation challenging disparities in education funding, petition-
ers have asked the courts to essentially derive and enforce a certain con-
stitutional standard of education.80 Cases involving the adequacy of
education funding, however, inject the courts into an inappropriate poli-
cymaking role, which in turn makes courts vulnerable to criticisms
regarding unwarranted judicial activism and institutional incompe-
tence.8' Traditionally, issues relating to education finance have been the
province of legislative bodies.8" Courts are not nearly as well equipped
77. Id. at 291, 297-300.
78. Choper, supra note 36, at 1489.
79. Avidan Y. Cover, Note, Is "Adequacy" a More "Political Question" than "Equality?":
The Effect of Standards-Based Education on Judicial Standards for Education Finance, 11
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 403, 403 (2002) (noting that "the question of how society funds
education is simultaneously a question regarding the definition of education itself and hence a
vision of that society as well").
80. Id. at 404-05.
81. Id. at 405-06.
82. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 38-53, 58-59 (1973)
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as are the legislative and executive branches to determine education
finance criteria and formulae. 3 Thus, given these considerations, courts
should refrain from hearing education finance cases, just as they abstain
from political question cases.
Perhaps privacy should be treated as religious exercise rights are
treated. Under the rule of Employment Division v. Smith, courts do not
upset legislative infringements on religious exercise rights unless certain
religious practitioners are singled out and treated differently than those
of majority religions.84 Smith allows the state to regulate religious exer-
cise with neutral, generally applicable laws that are judged under a less
rigorous standard of review. Likewise, privacy is inherently a neutral
right, possessed in equal degrees by all members of society. Conse-
quently, only if a legislature singles out the privacy rights of institution-
alized minorities should the courts intervene.
III. PRIVACY AS A POLITICAL QUESTION
A. Judicial Development of Privacy Rights
Even though privacy is not strictly a political question, we can use
the political question doctrine as a useful analogy. In particular, the cur-
rent constitutional right of privacy reflects the same view of judicial
supremacy that has been allowed to erode the political question doctrine.
The Court's recognition of a constitutional right of privacy began in
Griswold v. Connecticut, where the Court struck down a Connecticut
law prohibiting the use of contraceptives, even by married couples.8 5
The Court ruled that the statute violated "a zone of privacy" created by
the "penumbras" that gave "life and substance" to the specific guaran-
(upholding a state education finance system that resulted in unequal levels of spending among
local school districts caused by unequal distributions of taxable wealth).
83. See MICHAEL A. REBELL & ARTHUR R. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM, 5-15 (1982). This criticism is focused on
decisions such as the one made by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Rose v. Council for Better
Education, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). In that case, the court not only held that the funding of
Kentucky schools violated a constitutional provision requiring the legislature to "establish an
efficient system of common schools throughout the State," but also that the entire education
system was constitutionally inadequate. Id. at 216, 215. Likewise, in 2001, a New York trial
court ruled that the New York education system was unconstitutional because it failed to provide
adequate funding to New York City students. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 187
Misc. 2d 1, 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
84. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) ("[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of
the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that
the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).'),
superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C.A. §2000(b)(b)
(1993), as recognized in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct.
1211 (2006).
85. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a right of privacy exists).
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tees in the Bill of Rights.86 In outlining this zone of privacy, the Court
stated that even though some rights are not specifically enumerated in
the Constitution, they are nonetheless "peripheral" to various freedoms
in the Bill of Rights.87
Although Griswold may have initially appeared to link the constitu-
tional protection of sexual activity to married couples, Eisenstadt v.
Baird removed any such linkage.88 In Eisenstadt, the Court extended
Griswold's holding to include "the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child."8 9 As Justice Brennan declared, "[i]f under Griswold the
distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a
ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissi-
ble." 90 This decision marked a shift from privacy as "freedom from sur-
veillance or disclosure of intimate affairs," to privacy as "the freedom to
engage in certain activities" and "to make certain sorts of choices, free
of interference by the state."91
The Court, in Carey v. Population Services International, reiterated
that "the reasoning of Griswold could not be confined to the protection
of rights of married adults." 92 Carey extended the right of privacy to
minors engaging in consensual sexual behavior by overturning a state
statute that banned the distribution of contraceptives to minors as part of
a state policy against teen pregnancy. 93 The Carey Court saw the right
of privacy, as protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to include "the interest in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions. '
In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the right of privacy recognized
in the previous contraception cases was "broad enough to cover the
abortion decision." '95 Later, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
86. Id. at 484, 485.
87. Id. at 483-84.
88. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that a law banning the distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried persons violates the right of privacy, and hence extending the ruling in Griswold to
non-married individuals).
89. Id. at 453.
90. Id. (arguing for expanding the right of privacy to the individual from the couple).
91. Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality,
77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 527-28 (1989).
92. 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) (overturning a state law banning the distribution of
contraceptives to minors under 16 years of age).
93. Id. at 681.
94. Id. at 684 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)).
95. 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (including a woman's right to have an abortion within the zone
of privacy created in Griswold by ruling that an unborn fetus was not a "person" under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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Pennsylvania v. Casey, which reaffirmed Roe, Justice Kennedy elabo-
rated on the right to privacy:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life.96
This "right to define one's own concept of.. .the universe," 97 linking
the right to an abortion to other kinds of intimate choices, thus became
the latest evolution of the emanations from penumbras in Griswold that
first led to a recognized right to privacy. 98
The latest significant pronouncement from the Supreme Court on
the right of privacy came in Lawrence v. Texas,99 which held that a state
statute criminalizing same-sex sodomy violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause. In Lawrence, the Court applied the right of
privacy to hold that a Texas statute prohibiting people of the same sex
from engaging in certain sexual conduct violated the Due Process
Clause."°° Justice Kennedy's opinion recognized that the Court's earlier
decision in Eisenstadt had established that the right to make certain deci-
sions regarding sexual conduct extended to all adults, regardless of mari-
tal status. 10 1 But in Lawrence, the Court now gave explicit recognition
to a right of sexual intimacy, which it had been unwilling to make in
previous cases.' °2 Even though the Court seventeen years earlier in
Bowers v. Hardwick had found that there was not a fundamental right of
homosexuals to engage in sodomy, based upon a lack of history or tradi-
tion in protecting such a practice,' °3 the Lawrence Court found just the
opposite type of history and tradition, ruling that sodomy statutes
offended an individual's right to privacy.' °4 Consequently, in the wake
of Lawrence, there is no longer any question as to whether a right to
sexual privacy exists; the only question is what specific aspects of sex-
ual privacy can or cannot be regulated. 105 In his dissent, for instance,
96. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
97. Id. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (ruling that a Nebraska law
prohibiting partial-birth abortion overly burdens a woman's ability to choose, thus expanding
privacy rights to cover partial-birth abortions).
98. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
99. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
100. Id. at 567.
101. Id. at 565.
102. See Donald H.J. Hermann, Pulling the Fig Leaf off the Right of Privacy: Sex and the
Constitution, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, 928-930 (2005).
103. 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
104. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72.
105. See Williams v. Att'y Gen'l of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11 th Cir. 2004) (addressing the
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Justice Scalia predicted that the next logical step in the reasoning of
Lawrence would be the legalization of same-sex marriage.
°6
B. A Privacy Right Requires Unprincipled Judicial Line-Drawing
The Court's privacy rulings presume that judges have the ability
and duty to determine those personal choices that define human life and
sustain personal dignity. These rulings presume that courts can ade-
quately draw the fine lines between individual privacy, democratic val-
ues, and social policies. The constitutional doctrines on privacy further
presume that a centralized judiciary can better determine the parameters
of individual autonomy than can any democratically-elected legislature.
In its privacy decisions, the Court has not only used a right not
mentioned in the Constitution to dictate policy choices and social values
uniformly to every community in the nation, but in doing so it has
defined what constitutes the vital ingredients of personal dignity and
autonomy for all Americans. Moreover, as the privacy cases show, the
Supreme Court has decided that constitutional privacy is to be defined
almost exclusively in terms of sexual activity freedoms.
The Court defines privacy as involving those individual choices
"central to personal dignity and autonomy" that help "define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life."'0 7 The types of choices that qualify as those vital to human
development, according to the Court, include the choice to engage in
sexual conduct and the choice to have an abortion.' 08 Even though
human privacy is being assaulted every day by technologies that allow
unlimited opportunities to collect and disseminate intimate personal
information, the Court has not extended its privacy concerns to those
conditions or concerns. Indeed, individual claims against media or tech-
nological invasion of privacy have not found a receptive ear in the
Court. 109
The irony of the constitutional right of privacy is that it exists in a
society where every aspect of personal privacy other than sexual conduct
is being eroded. Sexual privacy is constitutionally protected, even
constitutionality of an Alabama statute regulating the distribution of sexual devices, including the
specific issue of whether the fight to sexual privacy includes the right to use sexual devices).
106. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). Under the Court's
privacy rulings, a judicially-articulated national value on sexual privacy can trump all other
community values or morals.
108. Id.
109. See Clifford S. Fishman, Technology and the Internet: The Impending Destruction of
Privacy by Betrayers, Grudgers, Snoops, Spammers, Corporations, and the Media, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1503, 1548-49 (2004).
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though identity and informational privacy is under increasing assault
from new technologies.l' 0 Professor Fishman has outlined the ways in
which technology is invading individual privacy."' He describes the
ubiquity of surveillance technology, the ease with which the Internet can
disseminate private information, and the ways in which personal data
can be acquired through the use of credit cards, e-mail, and even super-
market discount cards."' Even more ironically, especially when one
considers the constitutional efforts the judiciary has made to create a
right of privacy, the Supreme Court has greatly aided the invasion of
privacy by ruling that the media may publish or broadcast with impunity
the contents of intercepted communications known to have been unlaw-
fully intercepted, so long as the media did not participate in the unlawful
interception and the subject matter of the intercepted communications
was a matter of public concern. 113
Another paradox in the Court's privacy rulings is that, as it has
been developing a right to privacy, the Court has continued to downplay
or ignore property rights, which for a century and a half were an explicit
and primary focus of constitutional law. In fact, only after the Court
stopped treating property rights as fundamental rights, requiring a sub-
stantive due process analysis, did it begin to adopt a substantive due
process analysis for issues involving non-economic individual rights.' 14
110. See generally PATRICK RADDEN, CHATTER: DISPATCHES FROM THE SECRET WORLD OF
GLOBAL EAVESDROPPING (2005); ROBERT O'HARROW, No PLACE TO HIDE (2005) (outlining ways
in which personal data can be acquired and how people's movements and activities can be
followed or recorded). See also Rebecca A. Murray, Book Note, 3 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (2004)
(reviewing CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION: MEDIA PRIVACY, AND PEERING IN MODERN
CULTURE (2000)) (discussing various types of voyeurism made possible by new technologies, as
well as how the media uses its judicially-granted constitutional rights to invade individual
privacy).
I l1. Fishman, supra note 109.
112. Id. at 1505-11.
113. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001) (ruling that, in certain situations, the media
are immune from civil damages suits brought under the Wiretap Act). Aside from the media, the
government also participates in the erosion of personal privacy. For instance, nearly every state
employs a data encryption method on their driver's licenses. John T. Cross, Comment, Age
Verification in the Twenty-first Century, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 363, 372
(2005). However, when the license is swiped through a digital scanner (for age verification
purposes, for example), the private data stored on the card's magnetic strip is susceptible to theft.
Currently, more than seven million Americans are victimized by identity theft; and the driver's
license is a frequent means by which this theft occurs. Id. at 394.
114. See Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43-44 (1937),
where the Court refused to scrutinize legislation regulating labor relations under a substantive due
process analysis. Instead, the Court merely deferred to the congressional finding that there was a
rational basis for the regulations and that the regulated activities had a substantial economic effect.
Prior to 1937, property rights were seen by the Lochner-era Court as fundamental to the
Constitution's view of a free and independent life. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
But the New Deal constitutional revolution abandoned the doctrine of substantive due process
(that had been applied exclusively to property rights). Later, with the creation of privacy rights,
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But the unanswered question resulting from this legacy is whether prop-
erty rights are actually more important to individuals than are sexual
privacy rights. 1
15
Due to the way privacy has evolved as a court-created right, there is
an arbitrariness to the current constitutional doctrines. Why, for
instance, did the Court pick sexual activity as the area covered by pri-
vacy rights? What if there are many people who define themselves not
through their sexual activities, but through some other activity?' 16 Who
is to say that the only real measure of privacy is in sexual relations, as
the Court has suggested? Is sexual privacy so much more important to
human autonomy and dignity than informational privacy? Why is there
not a constitutional right of privacy against media disclosure of private
information, which seems far more violative of privacy rights than
restrictions on abortion? Daniel Solove, for instance, presents a compre-
hensive argument for legal protections against the public disclosure of
private information.' 17 As he suggests, protecting one's identity may be
a much more meaningful way of protecting privacy.
Privacy is not the kind of minority rights issue on which the courts
should possess sole authority." 8 If one is to believe the courts, everyone
sees sexual conduct as being essential to their self-definition; thus, eve-
ryone has an interest in, for example, the issue of contraception availa-
bility. Consequently, privacy can be best protected by the political
branches. Moreover, the Court's current approach to privacy prevents
the doctrine was revived; but this time, the nature of liberty that was found essential under the
Constitution for individual freedom and to which the Court gave heightened protection was not
economic liberty, but autonomy in intimate relations.
115. This is particularly evident in the public outrage to the 'public use takings' case of Kelo v.
City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2661 (2005), where the Supreme Court held that a city's
exercise of eminent domain power in furtherance of an economic development plan, even if used
to transfer property from one private party to another, satisfies the constitutional public use
requirement.
116. Evidence that the Framers did not recognize or even contemplate any kind of right to
sexual privacy can be seen in the plethora of eighteenth and nineteenth century laws punishing
adultery. See generally Carolyn B. Ramsey, Book Note, Sex and Social Order: The Selective
Enforcement of Colonial American Adultery Laws in the English Context, 10 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 191, 208-13 (1998) (reviewing MARY BETH NORTON, FOUNDING MOTHERS AND
FATHERS: GENDERED POWER AND THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY (1996)).
117. Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against
Disclosure, 53 Duke L.J. 967 (2003).
118. Regarding privacy and abortion rights, the Supreme Court has been accused of creating
new rights. See TOM CAMPBELL, SEPARATION OF POWERS 20 (2004). But to apply the right to
privacy to abortion, the Court has had to set in motion a whole train of consequences, including
the ruling that an unborn child is not a person. Consequently, the right to privacy became a
"super-right," which trumps even the interest in protecting potential life. Id. at 145, 147. Thus, to
arrive at a right to abortion through a general right to privacy, the Court had to find in the
Constitution a substantive right of privacy beyond anything that had ever previously existed.
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the public from putting the issue into a broader perspective, encompass-
ing a larger set of individual interests.
The legal concern with privacy and the recognition of a constitu-
tional right of privacy stemmed from an 1890 article by Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis." 9 This article focused on the public disclosure of
private matters and called for legal restraints on surveillance practices
conducted not just by the state, but by private parties, especially the
press. 120 Indeed, the technological and media developments of the twen-
tieth century, vastly increasing the automated processing of personal
information, have proven these concerns to be justified. Given the real-
ity of contemporary society, privacy should probably be defined more in
terms of control over personal information than solely in terms of sexual
choices. This is an area in which the political branches have long been
active. In fact, data protection laws show how privacy should be pro-
tected - through legislatures, not courts.
Through its information privacy laws, America has often preferred
the free flow of information over individual privacy rights.12' For
instance, although the Privacy Act of 1974 applied the fair information
practices to the federal public sector, there is no comprehensive informa-
tion privacy law applying information privacy principles to the private
sector. 2 2 Furthermore, information privacy laws have been enacted on
a piecemeal basis to deal with specific problems in isolated sectors, such
as in relation to credit information and financial institutions. 23 Thus,
the political process has balanced America's need for privacy with its
desire for public openness of information. As a reflection of this balanc-
ing, and because indications exist that the public is becoming more con-
cerned about the technological assault on privacy, Congress has become
far more active in its legislative agenda on privacy.
124
119. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
120. See id.
121. See Irving Louis Horowitz, Privacy, Publicity and Security: The American Context, 7
EMBO REPORTS S40, S42 (2006) (observing that the desire for privacy coincides with "a demand
for maximum access to information").
122. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2002).
123. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1971, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2005); Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000).
124. See Horowitz, supra note 121, at S42 (noting that the national legislative agenda is
currently contemplating the following privacy laws: the Financial Services Act, the Financial
Information Privacy Act, the Personal Privacy Protection Act, the Integrity in Voter Registration
Act, the Freedom and Privacy Restoration Act, the Consumer Intent Privacy Protection Act, the
Collections of Information Anti-Piracy Act, the Patient Protection Act, the Fraud Protection Act
and the Transportation Equity Act). Furthermore, Congress in its 2006 revisions of the Patriot Act
added certain privacy protections. Id. at S43.
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C. Privacy and Substantive Due Process
Since Griswold, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has served as the Court's "chosen vessel" for the protection of
unenumerated rights. 1 5 Under a substantive due process approach, the
Court recognizes a right as fundamental when it can be shown that the
right is grounded in tradition. 126 However, tradition can be a highly sub-
jective concept. 2 7  John Hart Ely states that "people have come to
understand that tradition can be invoked in support of almost any
cause."' 1 8 Consequently, the substantive due process approach has been
criticized as allowing judges to impose their own personal views at the
expense of the democratic process. According to Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, judges can use substantive due process to effectively rob the legis-
latures of their ability to consider important issues of self-governance. 
129
With substantive due process, judges must first decide whether a
certain right is fundamental. Yet, despite the Court's use of history and
tradition to make this determination, the definition of a fundamental
right seems to be a matter of judicial picking and choosing. There seems
to be little logic in determining what qualifies as a fundamental freedom,
unless one simply concludes that anything connected with sexual activ-
ity has a much greater chance of receiving fundamental rights status than
does any other human act or decision.
In Washington v. Glucksberg, which declined to hold physician-
assisted suicide a fundamental right, the Court emphasized the need to
resist expanding the scope of substantive due process.1 30 This was an
echo of Justice Harlan, who, in a pre-Griswold case involving state
restrictions on contraceptives, rejected the kind of expansive jurispru-
dence needed to arrive at a constitutional right of privacy.1 3 ' Heeding
Justice Harlan's advice, the Court in Glucksberg upheld the state of
Washington's ban on assisted suicide, despite Justice Scalia's acknowl-
edgment in an earlier case that there was little difference between refus-
ing medical treatment and physician-assisted suicide.'
3 2
125. Isaac J.K. Adams, Growing Pains: The Scope of Substantive Due Process Rights of
Parents of Adult Children, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1883, 1889 (2004).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1890.
128. John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term - Foreword: On Discovering
Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 39 (1978-1979) (noting that the problems that arise
from relying on tradition involve those of cultural geography, time, competing tradition, and
levels of generality).
129. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 470 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
130. 521 U.S. 702, 720-21, 735 (1997) (rejecting due process challenges to Washington's law
banning assisted suicide).
131. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548-49 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
132. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293-94 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
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The Glucksberg Court distinguished its ruling from that in the abor-
tion rights case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey by stating that a funda-
mental right involved only "those personal activities and decisions that
this Court has identified as so deeply rooted in our history and traditions,
or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty, that
they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."' 33 The Court also
admitted that just because "many of the rights and liberties protected by
the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant
the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and per-
sonal decisions are so protected."' 34 But the underlying questions
remain: How is assisted suicide so much less of a fundamental right than
assisted fetal termination? Why is sodomy protected, but not prostitu-
tion? Why doesn't the right of privacy extend to polygamy or the use of
recreational drugs? Although in Glucksberg the Court found no substan-
tive due process right, the Court in Cruzan had stated that the "choice
between life and death is a deeply personal decision" in which the "Due
Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refus-
ing life-sustaining medical treatment."'
135
A comparison of Glucksberg with Casey and Lawrence suggests
that substantive due process permits, and perhaps requires, a continually
fluid approach to constitutional interpretations, in which each generation
will read its own cultural practices into the Constitution. A comparison
of the cases also indicates the heightened status given to sex by substan-
tive due process. According to the Court, a person's destiny and mean-
ing of life is uniquely tied to her sexual orientation and activities.' 36
Sexual activity thus becomes the key component of personal dignity,
which under the Lawrence analysis seems to be more important than
either history or tradition in determining fundamental rights status.'37
The subjectivity and unpredictability inherent in the substantive
due process approach can also be seen in Lawrence's overruling of Bow-
ers. As recognized in Bowers, a fundamental right is one "deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition."'' 38 It has been observed that "the
concurring in the holding that a competent person has a constitutional right to refuse lifesaving
measures).
133. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 727.
134. Id. at 727 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1973)).
135. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
136. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
137. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602-05 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Constitution is not committed to substantive protection of sexual liberty against government
regulation and that sodomy reform is a matter of moral judgment better left to state political
processes).
138. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). The Bowers Court also rejected any other analysis used to find
(Vol. 61:169
2006] A DIFFERENT MODEL FOR THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 193
given values of a particular democratic community are the underpin-
nings for fundamental rights." 139 This community approach envisions
that "a state is free to act unless in doing so it offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental."140 In Bowers, the Court found no constitutional
basis for "a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy."''
After examining whether American history and tradition had in effect
created such a fundamental right, the Bowers Court concluded that
prohibitions against sodomy "have ancient roots" in history and that the
act of sodomy had been criminalized by many states since the colonial
era. 142
Seventeen years later, however, the Court reversed itself. In Law-
rence, Justice Kennedy conducted the same kind of historical examina-
tion that swayed the Court's decision in Bowers, but this time found no
national history or tradition of condemning homosexual sodomy. 43 As
Justice Kennedy wrote, history and traditions "show an emerging aware-
ness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex."'14 In
dissent, however, Justice Scalia argued that "'an emerging awareness'
does not establish a 'fundamental right."" 45 Scalia also noted that, con-
trary to the majority's ruling that the Texas anti-sodomy law had no
rational basis, "[c]ountless judicial decisions and legislative enactments
have relied on the ancient proposition that a governing majority's belief
that certain sexual behavior is 'immoral and unacceptable' constitutes a
rational basis for regulation. "146
fundamental rights: "Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to
discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution." Id. at 194.
Thus, Bowers refused to expand the fundamental rights protected by the Due Process Clause to
include homosexual sodomy.
139. Davin J. Hall, Note, Not So Landmark After All? Lawrence v. Texas, 13 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 617, 624 (2004).
140. Id.
141. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191. The Court also rejected the finding of a more general right to
sexual intimacy from which a right to engage in homosexual sodomy could be derived. Id. at 190-
91.
142. See id. at 192-93 (finding that sodomy was a common law crime at the time the Bill of
Rights was ratified, as well as when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted).
143. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567-74. The Court's conclusion here is
contradicted by what Richard John Neuhaus calls "five millennia of moral teaching about the right
ordering of human sexuality .. " Richard John Neuhaus, A Strange New Regime: The Naked
Public Square and the Passing of the American Constitutional Order, A Salvatori Lecture at the
Heritage Foundation (Oct. 8, 1996), in HERITAGE FOUNDATION REPORTS (1996), at 3.
144. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72.
145. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia called the decision an example of judicial
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Aside from the Bowers reversal, substantive due process has histor-
ically proved to be unreliable. The first era of substantive due process
took place from the latter part of the nineteenth century to the 1930s.
During this era, defined by the Court's decision in Lochner v. New
York,' 47 property and economic rights were protected under a substan-
tive due process approach. 14  Lochner rested on the Court's assertion
that liberty of contract was a fundamental right protected by the Due
Process Clause. 149 It was a conclusion that flowed from an earlier deci-
sion in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, in which the Due Process Clause was
interpreted as protecting
the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties;
to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he
will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any liveli-
hood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts
which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a
successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.150
Likewise, to the Lochner Court, liberty of contract was seen as central to
free life, a value of the highest order to be zealously protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
15 1
During the Lochner era, the Court struck down nearly two hundred
state laws for violating the liberty of contract inherent in the Due Pro-
cess Clause. 52  But the constitutional revolution of the New Deal
brought an end to this era. 153 Under pressure from President Roosevelt's
court-packing plan, the Court ceased using substantive due process to
strike down New Deal economic legislation.' 54 Lochner was not only
activism that seeks to declare homosexuality a fundamental right, even though "the court does not
have the boldness" to say so. Id. at 594, 604-605.
147. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61, 64-65 (1905) (striking down a New York law
imposing limitations on the maximum hours per week that bakers could work on the grounds that
the Due Process Clause gave heightened protection to economic liberty, which according to the
Court was fundamental to the Constitution's understanding of a free life). See also Peter
Berkowitz, The Court, the Constitution, and the Culture of Freedom, POL'Y REV. (Aug.-Sept.
2005), at 3, 6.
148. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, On the 100th Anniversary of Lochner v. New York, 72 TENN. L.
REV. 455, 506 (2005) (noting that the Lochner Court "equated due process with laissez-faire
economics").
149. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
150. 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
151. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
152. See Shaman, supra note 148, at 496-97 (arguing that "the Court made active and frequent
use of the Due Process Clause to strike down laws that the Court perceived as interfering with its
favorite fundamental right: liberty of contract").
153. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 145, 154 (1938) (holding
that the Filled Milk Act, a federal statute prohibiting the shipment of filled milk in interstate
commerce, was "a constitutional exercise of [Congress's] power to regulate interstate
commerce").
154. See Shaman, supra note 148, at 457.
[Vol. 61:169
2006] A DIFFERENT MODEL FOR THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 195
abandoned, it was roundly criticized as being "not merely a wrong deci-
sion, but a very bad one, as well." 155  Critics have since condemned
Lochner as a result of individual Justices injecting their personal views
into the Constitution. 156 Others have argued that the Due Process Clause
should address only procedural and not substantive matters.
57  Still
others have argued that the Fourteenth Amendment was aimed solely at
eliminating racial inequity in the aftermath of the Civil War.
58
Despite this criticism of substantive due process as a means to pro-
tect the liberty of contract during the pre-New Deal period, it has none-
theless been embraced as a source of protection for another judicially-
created fundamental right: the right of privacy. The Court in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, in language reminis-
cent of the Lochner era, ruled that substantive due process protects those
matters and choices "central to personal dignity and autonomy."' 59 And
yet, the Casey Court admitted that the Lochner era cases had been
wrongly decided and had rested on "fundamentally false factual assump-
tions" about human needs.160  Even when Lochner was overruled in
155. See id. at 475.
156. See id. at 475, 492.
157. See id. at 476 (noting the argument that "the phrase, 'due process,' after all, is indicative
of procedural matters"). Moreover, a historical examination of the meaning of "due process"
yields the conclusion that in 1791 the phrase "was generally understood to refer only to procedural
matters." Id. Even though substantive due process has been the path used by courts to create
privacy rights, procedural due process has also been a venue through which courts have expanded
rights at the expense of the legislative branch. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the
Court concluded that welfare benefits qualify as a kind of "new property," entitled to the
protections of procedural due process. Cass R. Sunstein & Randy E. Barnett, Constitutive
Commitments and Roosevelt's Second Bill of Rights: A Dialogue, 53 DRAKE L. REv. 205, 213
(2005). However, since the nation's beginning, welfare benefits had been seen as a mere
privilege, not a right. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603, 611 (1960) (holding that social security benefits did not constitute an "accrued property
right"). Prior to Goldberg, the Court had restricted the category of rights to the old kind of
"property," such as land, cash, bank accounts, and investments. Sunstein & Barnett, Constitutive
Commitments, 53 DRAKE L. REv. at 213. In Goldberg, however, the Court abandoned the right-
privilege distinction and ruled that welfare was indeed a form of constitutional "property."
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-65. This ruling exists despite the fact that there is no constitutional
right to receive welfare benefits in the first place. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484,
486 (1970) (rejecting a constitutional right to welfare benefits). But in expanding the
constitutional definition of property, the Court has ignored a crucial element in the traditional
definition: property is that which individuals gather in their private and social lives, apart from the
government. Individuals have no political recourse to a government taking their home, whereas
individuals do have a political recourse to a cutback in welfare benefits - they can reform the law
through the political process.
158. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1872) (stating that the "one
pervading purpose .. .at the foundation" of the Fourteenth Amendment was to remedy the
oppression suffered by the recently freed slaves).
159. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
160. Id. at 861-62.
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1937, the Court questioned the use of substantive due process to define
liberty of contract as a fundamental right:
What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of
contract. .. . There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to
contract as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty does not withdraw
from legislative supervision that wide department of activity which
consists of the making of contracts .... Liberty implies the absence
of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and
prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community. 6 '
The fate of Lochner and the demise of economic substantive due
process create real doubts as to the constitutional basis of the right of
privacy. Economic rights were once considered the pillar of human dig-
nity and independence, just as non-economic rights now seem to be
regarded. If economic and property rights, seen as fundamental during
the early twentieth century, could be suddenly downgraded because of
the changing political environment of the New Deal, then what is to
deny that privacy rights, now seen as fundamental, might also suffer the
same fate if political sensibilities change?1 62  Indeed, the Court has
become so indifferent to property rights that in Kelo v. City of New
London it ruled that the government could take by eminent domain a
group of working-class homes from their owners and turn the property
over to private parties for the purpose of economic development.
1 63
161. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1937) (citing Chicago, B & Q. R.
Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911)).
162. Economic rights were once considered the pillar of human dignity and independence, just
as non-economic rights now seem to be. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 97-98 (Field,
J., dissenting) (referencing the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, describing the
sanctity of private property as circumscribing a person's freedom); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113,
136 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[t]he principle upon which the opinion of the
majority proceeds is . . . subversive of the rights of private property, heretofore believed to be
protected by constitutional guaranties against legislative interference .. "). Both these dissents
provided the impetus for the substantive due process epitomized by Lochner.
163. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005). This ruling obviously
threatens the most sacred of American domains - the home. Furthermore, the homes were marked
for eminent domain not because they were blighted, but because they were needed to ensure an
economic development that would increase the city's tax base. Id. at 2664-65. And the
justification for this decision rested on a very broad reading of the term "public use" in the Fifth
Amendment's takings provision that private property could "be taken for public use" on payment
of just compensation. Id. at 2665-66. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens ruled that courts
should be highly deferential to government decisions to displace one private property owner in
favor of another private party in the name of economic development. Id. at 2668. But even if
economic compensation is given, the first owner is not compensated for any subjective losses
incurred as a result of not wanting to be forced out of a home in which they have many emotional
attachments. Id. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The decision set off a storm of protest. See Timothy Egan, Ruling Sets Off Tug of War Over
Private Property, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at Al (stating that the decision "set off a storm of
legislative action and protest, as states have moved to protect homes and businesses from the
expanded reach of eminent domain"). In Connecticut, where the case originated, the governor
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D. The Political Aspect of Privacy
The modem Court's use of substantive due process renders uncer-
tain the proper balance between legislative and judicial power. In 1824,
Chief Justice John Marshall expressed the prevailing view of the Court's
role: "Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect
to the will of the judge; always for the purpose of giving effect ... to the
will of the legislature."' 6 4 Marshall also suggested that, on doubtful
questions of constitutionality, the judgments of the political branches
"ought to receive a considerable impression."'' 65
The weakness of the substantive due process approach is that it
places before the Court issues that should be addressed in the democratic
arena. Through this approach, the Court seals off the democratic pro-
cess from addressing the matter at issue; but in doing so, as shown by
the abortion decisions, the Court only intensifies and prolongs the politi-
cal and legal anguish over the issue. 166 As John Hart Ely theorized, an
overactive judiciary exerts a suffocating influence on the democratic
process.' 67  Justice Kennedy repeated this theme when he said that
"'[s]ociety has to recognize that it has to confront hard decisions in neu-
tral, rational, dispassionate debate ... [a]nd not just leave it to the courts
.. . [because it's] a weak society that leaves it to courts.' "168
In Glucksberg, the Court recognized the dangers that substantive
due process posed, and it refused to transfer an important issue from the
political process to the judiciary. The Court noted that throughout the
nation, "Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about
the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide [and
o]ur holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic
society."' 169 Substantive due process cases require the courts not just to
judge the specifics of individual personal cases, but to lay down a gen-
eral rule that will govern a whole array of cases. The question is where
likened the public outrage to "the Boston Tea Party." Id. This reaction suggests that, contrary to
the Court's current substantive due process rulings, property rights might be even more vital to a
person's sense of autonomy than are sexual rights.
164. CHARLES L. BLACK JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 159-60 (1960).
165. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819).
166. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1002 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating that Roe foreclosed all democratic efforts at whatever consensus might have emerged
from the various political processes in the states).
167. "[Alt least in some situations judicial intervention becomes appropriate when the existing
processes of representation seem inadequately fitted to the representation of minority interests,
even minority interests that are not voteless," otherwise, the political process should be relied
upon to fix bad or undesirable laws. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 85-88 (1980). Thus, only when the democratic process is broken, according to
Ely, should the courts intervene. Id.
168. Jeffrey Rosen, The Agonizer, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 11, 1996, at 90.
169. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
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the lines should be drawn between privacy and social morality or com-
munity values, and this question - the matter of balancing interests to
arrive at social policy - is best addressed by the legislative branch. 70
The judiciary "is at a disadvantage in trying to ascertain facts not of the
kind presented as evidence in trials."'71
One measure of the degree of opposition to the Court's right of
privacy decisions can be seen in the reaction of state courts to the use of
economic substantive due process. Although economic substantive due
process was frequently used in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, it has
recently gone into a significant decline.' 72 According to Professor Sand-
ers, this decline stems from the widespread opposition to the use of sub-
stantive due process to arrive at the privacy right that in turn produced
the right to an abortion in Roe v. Wade.'73 Because the critics of Roe
"had to find fault with the case in order to have any hope of overturning
it... [t]he easiest way to do so was to discredit substantive due process
itself."' 74 As Professor Sanders has noted:
When faced with the choice of (1) distinguishing "economic substan-
tive due process" from substantive due process and the "right to pri-
vacy," and (2) discrediting the use of substantive due process
altogether, enough conservative state justices appear to have chosen
the latter approach so that the number of economic substantive due
process cases has had nowhere to go but down.
17 5
As a result of their opposition to how substantive due process was used
to produce a right to an abortion, even the supporters of economic and
property rights have ceased relying on substantive due process as a
means of protecting those rights.
Similar to those who argue that the political question doctrine com-
mands the judiciary to defer to the political branches on various consti-
tutional matters, some scholars claim that the Court should not be given
the exclusive job of constitutional interpretation. Larry Kramer insists
that Madison "never wavered in his belief that final authority to resolve
disagreements over [the Constitution's] meaning must always rest with
170. See TOM CAMPBELL, SEPARATION OF POWERS IN PRACTICE 20, 22-25 (2004).
171. Id. at 22.
172. See Anthony B. Sanders, The New Judicial Federalism Before Its Time: A Comprehensive
Review of Economic Substantive Due Process Under State Constitutional Law Since 1940 and the
Reasons for its Recent Decline, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 499-500, 507, 512 (2005) (arguing that
there has been such a complete opposition to substantive due process that many traditional
advocates of economic substantive due process have now turned against substantive due process
review generally).
173. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (finding that the right of privacy includes the right to choose an
abortion); Sanders, supra note 171, at 499-500.
174. Sanders, supra note 172, at 505 (stating that this approach "would assist in overturning
Roe, but would also discredit the use of due process clauses in protecting economic liberty").
175. Id. at 510.
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the people."' 7 6 In Madison's view, the judiciary was never to be the
supreme judge of constitutional meaning.' 77 According to Professor
Kramer, the notion of judicial supremacy, which is based on a wide-
spread belief that the Supreme Court is the ultimate constitutional
authority, has sapped much of the life from democratic politics. He
dates the victory of judicial supremacy back to the Warren Court of the
1960s, when "the principle of judicial supremacy came to monopolize
constitutional theory and discourse," at least in the area of individual
rights.' 78 Thus, he disagrees with those who claim that the Court has
been the supreme voice in constitutional interpretation throughout most
of the nation's history.
179
For certain highly contentious issues, the Court should not impose a
single, uniform resolution, but should instead remand the issues to the
democratic process to flush out all the viewpoints, educate the polity,
and reach a compromise consensus. 1° This process allows for individ-
ual freedoms and interests to be shaped according to the democratic
desires of the people possessing those freedoms. The constitutional
right to privacy, for instance, reflects a rigid judicial mandate on a mat-
ter in which every citizen has an interest and which continually changes
as society and social relationships change.
In the early abortion cases, the Court prematurely removed from
the political process one of the most difficult and divisive public law
debates of American history. 8' Because state legislatures all over the
country were beginning to rethink their abortion laws in the early
1970s,' 82 the Court should have denied review in Roe so that the issue
176. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 47 (2004). Although Madison tried to place structural barriers between
government and popular rule, he continually maintained that the people defined the Constitution,
not only through the amendment process, but also through political action like elections. See
EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND
AND AMERICA 94-121 (1988).
177. Daniel Hulsebosch, Bringing the People Back In, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 653, 678 (2005)
(reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)).
178. KRAMER, supra note 176, at 219-220, 224 (noting that judicial supremacy took hold in the
middle of the twentieth century when the Court, after having given up monitoring structure-of-
government issues during the New Deal, became active in protecting individual rights).
179. Id. at 208. Kramer's views are supported by John Marshall and Joseph Story, both of
whom considered Congress to have the primary role in interpreting the Constitution and adapting
it to changing circumstances. Robert J. Kaczorowski, Popular Constitutionalism Versus Justice in
Plainclothes: Reflections from History, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1415, 1425 (2005) (noting that the
Court's power of judicial review permitted it to nullify acts of Congress only in very limited
circumstances where Congress had clearly exercised constitutionally prohibited powers).
180. William Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by
Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1283 (2005).
181. Id. at 1282.
182. Id. at 1312.
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could ripen.'83 Furthermore, abortion does not represent a minority right
that only the courts can protect. Women constitute a voting majority,
and there is no procedural reason why the political process should not
take account of their interests." 4 For this reason, John Hart Ely argued
that it would be more legitimate for women's rights reforms to win in
the legislative rather than the judicial process.1
8 5
The rise of judicial supremacy, which has not only weakened the
political question doctrine but also transferred policy-making powers
from the legislative to the judicial branch, has caused an unjustified
expansion in the types of cases heard by the courts, as well as a distor-
tion in how those cases are decided. Privacy serves as a good example.
Within the judicial arena, privacy has come to reflect an unrealistic and
unworkable notion of individual autonomy. The Court's privacy doc-
trine, for instance, promotes "the illusion that individuals are sovereign
jurisdictions, entitled to and able to exercise the most significant per-
sonal liberties without concern for others."'8 6 This illusion views the
individual as completely separate from society, owing no duties to soci-
ety and not dependent on society for his or her physical comfort, emo-
tional satisfaction or personal security and liberty. It sees individuals as
radically self-determining, denying that individuals are socially con-
structed or that they are social creatures.
Privacy rights activists see the individual ideal as being in a state of
nature. But this is not how the Constitution sees individuals, especially
individuals who are members of a democratic society. 87 The Constitu-
tion is primarily concerned with the workings of the democratic commu-
nity, not with trying to return individuals to some imaginary state of
nature. The Framers did not see human beings as solitary creatures, with
no relationships or obligations to society. 88 Indeed, by joining demo-
cratic society, the individual is no longer in a state of nature. Therefore,
laws should not be crafted as if individuals lived separate from society,
disconnected from its democratic process. According to William Black-
183. Id. at 1313. A criticism of Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), but also a criticism of the
privacy decisions, is that judicial resolution of the issue removes it from the political process and
wipes out any room for deliberation or dialogue. Barkow, supra note 16, at 296. With the Court
injecting itself into the democratic process in a way it had not done before, the public never was
able to take part in the deliberations or to have a role in resolving the controversy. Id. at 297.
184. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 164-69 (1980).
185. Id.
186. Robert F. Nagel, Privacy and Celebrity: An Essay on the Nationalization of Intimacy, 33
U. RICH-. L. REV. 1121, 1140 (2000).
187. See Horowitz, supra note 121, at S43 (stating that "[tiaken to one extreme, privacy results
in total isolation and denies the social bases of human existence. At the other extreme, unlimited
communication and the end of privacy leaves the human depleted of self and of personality.").
188. Ely, supra note 184, at 67.
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stone, when society was formed, individuals gave up the liberty they
enjoyed in the state of nature and exchanged it for a more limited set of
liberties and rights under civil society. 8 9 However, the Court's privacy
rulings seem to presume that individual freedom cannot truly exist
within majoritarian rule, as if majoritarian rule is inherently oppressive.
CONCLUSION
The Court derived its constitutional right of privacy through the
substantive due process approach. But critics have maligned this
approach, arguing that the judicial articulation of fundamental rights
involves a subjective and ideologically-infused approach. Critics have
also argued that substantive due process involves the courts in the kind
of policymaking process that belongs to the political branches. This
Article adds to that criticism by applying the political question doctrine
to the constitutional right of privacy.
Even though the political question doctrine does not normally apply
to matters of individual rights, its framework and analysis can provide a
useful and insightful model for determining whether privacy matters
belong in the courts or in the legislatures. By examining the criteria of
the political question doctrine, this Article reveals how the constitutional
right of privacy is not well-suited for judicial resolution and should
instead be left to the democratic legislatures. Employing the political
question doctrine methodology also demonstrates that the substantive
due process approach used in deriving the constitutional right of privacy
may very well be the wrong approach.
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Chi. Press 1979) (1765).
